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The Role of State Antitrust Law in the 
Aftermath of Actavis 
Richard A. Samp* 
The Supreme Court’s June 2013 decision in FTC v. Actavis, 
Inc.1 raised as many new questions as it answered regarding 
the application of antitrust law to drug patent settlement 
agreements. The Court steered a middle course on the issue of 
so-called “reverse payment” settlements, concluding that such 
settlements might violate federal antitrust law but providing 
little guidance regarding when violations should be found. The 
Court concluded that reverse payment settlements should be 
subject to the “rule of reason,” rejecting both the FTC’s 
argument that they should be deemed presumptively 
anticompetitive and the much more restrictive “scope of the 
patent” test espoused by the lower court.2 
Further complicating the issue is the possible application 
of state antitrust law. Private plaintiffs who challenge reverse 
payment settlements often allege that the settlements violate 
state antitrust law as well as federal antitrust law.3 
Defendants who successfully defend against federal antitrust 
claims may still find themselves facing claims that their patent 
settlements nonetheless violated state law. A key issue with 
                                                          
© 2014 Richard A. Samp 
 *  Chief Counsel, Washington Legal Foundation. 
 1. 133 S. Ct. 2333 (2013). 
 2. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237–38. 
 3. See, e.g., Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 
F.3d 98 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 
544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 
F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The district court . . . . dismissed the plaintiffs’ state-
law claims, which had alleged violations of the antitrust laws of seventeen 
states and violations of consumer protection and unfair competition laws of 
twenty-one states, because those claims were based on the same allegations as 
the plaintiffs’ federal antitrust claims.” (internal citation omitted)); In re 
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003); In re Cipro Cases 
I & II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165, 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), rev. granted, 269 P.3d 
653 (Cal. 2012). 
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respect to state claims will have to be addressed by the courts: 
to what extent does federal law preempt state antitrust law in 
this area? In particular, are states permitted to impose 
antitrust liability on parties to reverse payment patent 
settlements for conduct not deemed actionable under federal 
law? 
This paper concludes that state antitrust liability can be 
imposed on parties to patent settlements so long as the state 
action “parallels” federal antitrust law. On the other hand, 
state law is preempted to the extent that it seeks to impose 
antitrust liability for conduct not deemed actionable under 
federal law; under such circumstances, state-law liability would 
be impliedly preempted because it would stand as an obstacle 
to accomplishing the purposes of federal patent law. The scope 
of preemption likely would include any effort by states to apply 
a stricter standard of review to reverse payment patent 
settlements—either a “quick look” review accompanied by a 
presumption of illegality, or a declaration that such settlements 
are “per se” illegal. 
Part I of this paper summarizes federal preemption law as 
it has been applied to state antitrust actions. It explains that 
the U.S. Supreme Court has never interpreted federal antitrust 
law as imposing a limit on states’ authority to regulate 
business practices deemed by states to have anticompetitive 
effects. Nonetheless, federal courts have not hesitated to rule 
that state antitrust law is preempted by federal law when they 
determine that state law comes into conflict with some other 
federal statute. In this instance, the relevant “other federal 
statute” is federal patent law. 
Part II examines the Supreme Court’s Actavis decision and 
explains that Actavis attempted to balance the conflicting 
demands of federal antitrust law and patent law. The decision 
was based on what the Court deemed the appropriate balance 
between those conflicting demands, and the paper concludes 
that states may not adopt policies that would conflict with the 
balance arrived at by the Court. 
Parts III and IV examine the extent to which Activis and 
other Supreme Court decisions should be deemed to preempt 
state antitrust law challenges to reverse payment patent 
settlements. They conclude that state antitrust law should be 
deemed preempted to the extent that it attempts to impose 
liability under state law in circumstances under which federal 
law would not permit imposition of antitrust liability. The 
paper recognizes, however, that state antitrust claims of this 
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sort are likely to become increasingly common and that 
defendants may not always prevail in their efforts to convince 
state courts to rule that expansive state law claims are 
preempted. Moreover, even when state courts are purporting to 
do no more than enforce state antitrust law that merely 
“parallels” federal antitrust law, defendants may nonetheless 
encounter greater difficulty (in comparison to federal court 
proceedings) in convincing a state-court fact-finder that 
settlement of their patent dispute had pro-competitive effects. 
I. STATE ANTITRUST LAW 
Congress has passed a series of laws over the past 125 
years designed to prevent businesses from engaging in 
anticompetitive conduct that results in higher prices for 
consumers. Most prominently, it adopted the Sherman Act in 
1890.4 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, 
combination in the form or trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States.”5 
Among the types of agreements deemed to constitute per se 
violations of section 1 are agreements among competitors to 
limit output.6 
Many states have also adopted antitrust statutes. While 
those laws tend to be similar to federal law, their language is 
not identical, and state courts routinely interpret state 
antitrust laws in ways that diverge sharply from federal law.7 
For example, California’s antitrust statute, the Cartwright 
Act,8 diverges in a number of respects from federal antitrust 
law. The California Supreme Court recently cautioned, 
“[i]nterpretations of federal antitrust law are at most 
                                                          
 4. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012)). 
 5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 6. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 
877, 893 (2007) (“A horizontal cartel among competing manufacturers or 
competing retailers that decreases output or reduces competition in order to 
increase price is, and ought to be, per se unlawful.”). 
 7. Cf. Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 
IND. L.J. 375, 377 n.10 (1983) (“As a general matter, state antitrust laws are 
substantively similar to federal antitrust law, and many state courts have 
held that case law interpreting the federal statutes is fully applicable to 
corresponding state statutes. . . . [H]owever, as a result either of statutory 
language or judicial interpretation, some state antitrust laws are now broader 
than federal law.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 8. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700–16770 (West 2008). 
152 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 15:1 
instructive, not conclusive, when construing the Cartwright 
Act . . . .”9 
The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected claims that state 
antitrust law is preempted whenever it diverges from federal 
antitrust law. For example, the Court permitted the Attorneys 
General of Alabama, Arizona, California, and Minnesota to file 
antitrust claims under their respective state laws against a 
group of cement producers even though those state 
governments, because they did not purchase cement directly 
from the producers but rather purchased only through 
intermediaries, would not have been proper plaintiffs under 
federal antitrust law.10 Under federal law, when producers 
conspire to fix prices, only direct purchasers, and not 
subsequent indirect purchasers, are permitted to sue to recover 
losses incurred as a result of the conspiracy.11 In contrast, 
antitrust laws from the four states permitted recovery by 
indirect purchasers.12 The Supreme Court rejected the 
defendant cement producers’ assertion that federal antitrust 
law was intended to serve as a ceiling on businesses’ liability 
for engaging in anticompetitive conduct.13 It stated, “Congress 
intended the federal antitrust laws to supplement, not displace, 
state antitrust remedies. And on several prior occasions, the 
Court has recognized that the federal antitrust laws do not pre-
empt state law.”14 
On the other hand, state antitrust laws—like all state 
laws—are subject to the restrictions imposed by the Supremacy 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution,15 and are impliedly preempted 
                                                          
 9. Aryeh v. Canon Bus. Solutions, Inc., 292 P.3d 871, 877 (Cal. 2013). 
 10. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989); see id. at 101–02 
(“There is no claim that the federal antitrust laws expressly pre-empt state 
laws permitting indirect purchaser recovery . . . . Congress intended the 
federal antitrust laws to supplement, not displace, state antitrust remedies.”). 
 11. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730–32 (1977); id. at 746 (“[T]he 
legislative purpose in creating a group of private attorneys general to enforce 
the antitrust laws . . . is better served by holding direct purchasers to be 
injured to the full extent of the overcharge paid by them than by attempting to 
apportion the overcharge among all that may have absorbed a part of it.” 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
 12. ARC, 490 U.S. at 98. 
 13. Cf. id. at 105 (“Ordinarily, state causes of action are not pre-empted 
solely because they impose liability over and above that authorized by federal 
law, and no clear purpose of Congress indicates that we should decide 
otherwise in this case.” (citation omitted)). 
 14. Id. at 102 (citation omitted). 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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to the extent that they conflict with federal law.16 Such a 
conflict arises when “compliance with both federal and state 
regulations is a physical impossibility,”17 or when a state law 
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”18 On a number of 
occasions, the Supreme Court has concluded that state 
antitrust law is preempted because it conflicts with a federal 
statute other than federal antitrust law.19 
The Court has been particularly quick to find preemption 
when state antitrust law has an impact on labor law, an area in 
which federal law is pervasive.20 Indeed, on at least one 
occasion, the Court found that a claim arising under state 
antitrust law was preempted by federal labor law even though 
the Court concluded that the conduct that gave rise to the state 
claim could proceed as a claim under federal antitrust law.21 
The Court explained that “Congress and this Court have 
carefully tailored the antitrust statutes to avoid conflict with 
the labor policy favoring lawful employee organization, not only 
by delineating exemptions from antitrust coverage but also by 
adjusting the scope of the antitrust remedies themselves.”22 
The Court said that state antitrust laws “generally have not 
been subjected to this process of accommodation” and thus that 
“[t]he use of state antitrust law . . . [must] be pre-empted 
because it creates a substantial risk of conflict with policies 
central to federal labor law.”23 
Accordingly, in any challenge to a “reverse payment” 
patent settlement arising under state antitrust law, a court 
will likely be required to address whether the claim conflicts 
with the “balance” between federal antitrust law and federal 
patent law established by the Supreme Court’s Actavis 
                                                          
 16. See, e.g., Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2013) 
(“Even in the absence of an express pre-emption provision, the Court has 
found state law to be impliedly pre-empted where it is ‘impossible for a private 
party to comply with both state and federal requirements.’”). 
 17. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 
(1963). 
 18. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 19. See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union 
No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975); Local 24 of Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 
U.S. 283 (1959). 
 20. See, e.g., Local 24, 358 U.S. at 296. 
 21. Connell Constr. Co., 421 U.S. at 635–36. 
 22. Id. at 636. 
 23. Id. at 635–36. 
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decision. If such state-law antitrust claims stand as an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress in adopting the patent laws, it will be 
preempted by federal law. 
II. “REVERSE PAYMENT” PATENT SETTLEMENTS 
When parties to litigation enter into a settlement, one 
would normally expect that any cash payments would flow 
from the defendant to the plaintiff. The defendant pays cash in 
return for something from the plaintiff: the abandonment of a 
legal claim. The normal expectations have been reversed in the 
context of litigation involving prescription drug patents, 
however, as the result of financial incentives created by the 
Hatch-Waxman Act,24 a federal statute adopted in 1984. Hatch-
Waxman was designed to ensure that generic versions of 
prescription drugs enter the market more quickly, thereby 
driving down drug prices.25 The Act includes a provision that 
permits generic companies, by announcing plans to market a 
drug before expiration of the drug’s patent, to essentially force 
the patent holder to immediately file a patent infringement 
suit.26 That provision sets drug patent litigation apart from all 
other types of patent litigation. It allows generics to challenge 
the validity of a drug patent in a virtually risk-free manner—
because they can induce a patent lawsuit without actually 
selling an infringing product,27 generics can place a patent’s 
                                                          
 24. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-
Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 16, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.). 
 25. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 n.2 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (“The purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act was threefold: (1) to 
reduce the average price paid by consumers; (2) preserve the technologies 
pioneered by the brand-name pharmaceutical companies; and (3) create an 
abbreviated new drug application (‘ANDA’) to bring generic drugs to the 
market.”). 
 26. See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent 
Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1566 
(2006) (“Submitting an ANDA containing such [a Paragraph IV Certification] 
is an act of infringement that often prompts the innovator to file a patent 
suit.” (footnote omitted); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012) 
(requiring a generic drug company planning to market a generic version of a 
patented drug to certify to the FDA, as one of four options, that the patentee’s 
patent “is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of 
the new drug for which the application is submitted”). 
 27. See Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals, 
24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281, 293–94 (2011) (“[U]nlike usual patent litigation 
where the dispute touches on products that are already on or about to enter 
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validity at issue without the risk of incurring the potentially 
bankrupting damage awards normally associated with patent 
litigation.28 
While the cost of litigation is about the only loss that a 
generic company is likely to suffer if it loses a drug patent 
infringement lawsuit, the stakes are much higher for the 
typical prescription drug patent holder. It likely spent 
hundreds of millions of dollars to obtain FDA approval to 
market its product.29 It can hope to recoup those costs only if it 
can maintain the validity of its patent and thereby prevent 
competition from generic manufacturers.30 For a typical brand-
name prescription drug manufacturer, its patents on the drugs 
it produces are far and away its most valuable assets. A brand-
name drug manufacturer often stands to lose billions of dollars 
in future revenues if one of its key drug patents is declared 
invalid.31 In light of the dynamics created by the Hatch-
Waxman Act, it is hardly surprising that generic companies—
even though they are the defendants in drug patent 
infringement litigation—are in a position to demand cash or 
other valuable assets in return for agreeing to settlement of the 
patent litigation. 
                                                          
the market, Hatch-Waxman litigation occurs prior to the generic drug actually 
entering the market.”). 
 28. See id. Individuals generally lack legal standing to challenge the 
validity of patents issued to another. Such challenges only come about as a 
defense to an infringement lawsuit filed by the patent holder, and 
infringement suits (outside the context of prescription drug patents) may be 
filed only after the defendant has started to sell an infringing product. 
Because damages in an infringement suit are awarded on the basis of losses 
suffered by the patent holder and because such damages can often be many 
times larger than the profits earned by the defendant from his infringing 
sales, the loss of a significant patent lawsuit can easily drive the infringer into 
bankruptcy. 
 29. See Hemphill, supra note 26, at 1564–65 (“[Demonstrating that a drug 
is safe and effective as part of a so-called New Drug Application (NDA) is a 
lengthy, expensive process, consuming years and many millions of dollars to 
conduct the necessary clinical trials.” (footnote omitted)). 
 30. See id. at 1562–63. 
 31. See id. at 1557 (“If the generic firm wins in litigation, either by 
establishing that the patent is invalid or not infringed by the generic firm’s 
competing product, the generic firm wins the means to enter the market prior 
to scheduled expiration. Successful pre-expiration challenges reallocate 
billions of dollars from producers to consumers.”). 
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III. ACTAVIS: AN ANTITRUST CHALLENGE TO “REVERSE 
PAYMENT” SETTLEMENTS 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has long complained 
about the allegedly anticompetitive effects of “reverse payment” 
patent settlements—settlements whose terms include a cash 
payment from the drug patent holder to the alleged infringer.32 
The FTC contends that by making such payments, patent 
holders are in effect paying potential competitors not to 
compete, thereby restricting supply and driving up prices.33 
Drug companies have responded that such settlements cannot 
have an anticompetitive effect so long as the settlement does 
not prohibit any competition that was not already barred under 
the terms of the patent.34 They argue that because litigation is 
always a drain on productivity, settlements of patent disputes 
ought to be encouraged for their pro-competitive effects35 and 
that existing patents ought to be presumed valid.36 
Lower federal courts have struggled for more than a 
decade to craft a coherent theory for addressing antitrust 
challenges to reverse payment settlements.37 On the one hand, 
there is reason for concern about the competitive consequences 
of settlements that include substantial payments from the 
patent holder to the alleged infringer. Very large payments 
may be an indication that the settling parties recognized that 
the patent was particularly vulnerable to invalidation,38 and 
thus that competition would have begun much sooner had the 
infringement suit been permitted to proceed to a trial, at which 
                                                          
 32. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013) (“Company A sues 
Company B for patent infringement. The two companies settle under terms 
that require (1) Company B, the claimed infringer, not to produce the patented 
product until the patent’s term expires, and (2) Company A, the patentee, to 
pay B many millions of dollars. Because the settlement requires the patentee 
to pay the alleged infringer, rather than the other way around, this kind of 
settlement agreement is often called a ‘reverse payment’ settlement 
agreement.”). 
 33. See Brief for the Petitioner at 15–16, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 267027. 
 34. See Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc. at 47, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 
S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 662705. 
 35. Id. at 51. 
 36. Id. at 18–19. 
 37. See, e.g., Carl W. Hittinger & Lesli C. Esposito, In re K-Dur Antitrust 
Litigation: The Third Circuit’s Controversial Pay-for-Delay Antitrust Decision 
Splits with Other Circuit Courts, 58 VILL. L. REV. 103, 107–15 (2013). 
 38. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Are Settlements of Patent 
Disputes Illegal Per Se?, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 491, 533–34 (2002). 
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the patent almost surely would have been declared invalid. 
Viewed in that light, payments from the patent holder to the 
alleged infringer can be seen as a device for sharing monopoly 
rents made possible by the alleged infringer’s agreement not to 
compete.39 
On the other hand, a patent holder has a legal right to a 
monopoly on the sale of its patented product. It thus is hard to 
fault the patent holder for taking steps to enforce that right, 
even if those steps include making payments to litigation 
opponents where economic incentives created by the Hatch-
Waxman Act essentially require such payments as the price of 
settling litigation.40 
One potential solution to this dilemma is to instruct trial 
courts to examine the strength of the underlying patent.41 
Under that approach, a reverse payment patent settlement 
would be deemed anticompetitive, and thus in violation of 
federal antitrust law, if and only if the court determined that 
the patent was weak and likely would have been declared 
invalid had the patent infringement suit been allowed to go to 
trial. But advocates on both sides of the issue have resisted 
that approach because it would require overly complex trials. 
District courts conducting an antitrust trial would be required 
to retry the previously-settled patent dispute, hearing 
voluminous evidence regarding patent validity.42 To avoid that 
                                                          
 39. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of 
Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1749–51 (2003). 
 40. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187,    
209–10 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 144 (2007). 
 41. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, Joblove 
v. Barr Labs., Inc, 551 U.S. 1144 (2007) (No. 06-830), 2007 WL 1511527 (“The 
dissenting opinion below correctly suggested that a court reviewing an 
antitrust challenge to a settlement of a patent infringement claim that 
includes a reverse payment should apply the rule of reason—and that, in 
doing so, a court should consider ‘the strength of the patent as it appeared at 
the time at which the parties settled.’”). 
 42. Cf. Dolin, supra note 27, at 284–85 (“[T]he antitrust approach may 
undermine patent law uniformity, as presumably whatever findings a district 
court would make on antitrust liability could—and would—be appealed. The 
appeals, like any other appeal on issues of antitrust law, would likely be heard 
by the regional circuit courts of appeals, which would then be tasked with 
evaluating the validity and strength of the patents underlying the antitrust 
litigation. This could put the regional circuits on a collision course with the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which is a specialist court with 
exclusive jurisdiction over patent disputes. Such an outcome would put 
complicated technical patent questions in the hands of non-specialist judges, 
and would run directly contrary to the congressional desire for uniformity of 
patent law throughout the country.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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result, the FTC has argued that reverse payment settlements 
should be deemed per se antitrust violations,43 reasoning that 
patent holders should be required to agree to an earlier onset of 
generic competition in lieu of making cash payments to the 
alleged infringers. 
Prior to 2012, the FTC and private plaintiffs had lost their 
challenges to reverse payment drug patent settlements. The 
Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits each adopted the so-
called “scope of the patent” test, which holds that agreements 
that do not extend beyond the exclusionary effect of a patent do 
not injure lawful competition unless the patent was procured 
by fraud or the infringement claim was objectively baseless.44 
Under this standard, the patent holder’s right to exclude 
infringing competition is fully respected unless the antitrust 
plaintiff can demonstrate that the patent had no exclusionary 
effect at all.45 
In 2012, the Third Circuit created a split among the federal 
appeals courts by adopting the FTC’s position. It held that 
reverse payment settlements are prima facie evidence of an 
unreasonable restraint of trade, and that the settling parties 
can rebut that presumption only if they are able to 
demonstrate, during a “quick look” analysis, that the 
settlement actually has pro-competitive effects.46 The Third 
Circuit added that it agreed with the FTC that 
there is no need to consider the merits of the underlying patent suit 
because absent proof of other offsetting consideration, it is logical to 
conclude that the quid pro quo for the payment was an agreement 
                                                          
 43. By the time Actavis reached the Supreme Court, the FTC had 
modified its position. Instead of seeking a per se rule, the FTC argued that 
reverse payment settlements should be merely presumptively unlawful, and 
that courts should conduct a “quick look” review during which the settling 
parties would bear the burden of demonstrating that their settlement was, in 
fact, pro-competitive. Brief for the Petitioner at 33–40, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 
133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 267027. 
 44. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 557 U.S. 920 (2009); In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 213; 
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
584 U.S. 919 (2006). 
 45. See, e.g., Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1066 (“[T]he proper analysis of 
antitrust liability requires an examination of: (1) the scope of the exclusionary 
potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed that 
scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects.”). 
 46. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated, 
133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013). 
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by the generic to defer entry beyond the date that represents an 
otherwise reasonable litigation compromise.47 
Actavis resolved that circuit split. 
The Actavis litigation was an FTC challenge to a reverse 
payment settlement of patent infringement litigation involving 
a brand-name drug called AndroGel.48 Under the terms of the 
settlement, the alleged infringers (several generic drug 
manufacturers) agreed not to market their generic versions of 
AndroGel until August 2015, sixty-five months before the 
AndroGel patent was scheduled to expire.49 The settlement also 
required the patent holder to pay many millions of dollars to 
the generic manufacturers; it stated that the payments were in 
return for other services to be performed by the generics for the 
patent holder.50 The FTC filed a complaint against all settling 
parties under federal antitrust law, contending that “the true 
point of the payments was to compensate the generics for 
agreeing not to compete against AndroGel until 2015.”51 
Applying its previously adopted “scope of the patent” test, the 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the 
FTC’s complaint.52 It reasoned that the settlement could not be 
deemed to have anticompetitive effects because it permitted 
generic competition sixty-five months before the underlying 
patent was scheduled to expire.53 The Supreme Court granted 
review to resolve the conflict between the Third Circuit on the 
one hand and the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits on 
the other hand. 
In its June 2013 decision, the Supreme Court rejected both 
the “scope of the patent” test and the Third Circuit’s 
“presumption of unreasonable restraint” test.54 The Court 
declined to adopt any bright line test and instead directed 
lower courts to analyze the potential anticompetitive effects of 
reverse payment settlements under a traditional “rule of 
reason” analysis.55 The Court repeatedly emphasized that 
courts must “balance” the competing interests of federal 
                                                          
 47. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 48. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub 
nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 53. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227, 2229. 
 54. Id. at 2237–38. 
 55. Id. 
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antitrust and patent law, explaining that “patent and antitrust 
policies are both relevant in determining the ‘scope of the 
patent monopoly’—and consequently antitrust law immunity—
that is conferred by a patent.”56 
The Court acknowledged the legitimacy of the concerns 
that had led the Eleventh Circuit to adopt the “scope of the 
patent” test: the desirability of promoting settlements and the 
“fear that antitrust scrutiny of a reverse payment agreement 
would require the parties to litigate the validity of the patent in 
order to demonstrate what would have happened to 
competition in the absence of the settlement” and would “prove 
time consuming, complex, and expensive.”57 The Court 
nonetheless held that other considerations led it “to conclude 
that the FTC should have been given the opportunity to prove 
its antitrust claim.”58 Chief among those considerations was 
the Court’s conclusion that settlements have the “potential for 
genuine adverse effects on competition,”59 particularly when 
reverse payments are so large that they cannot be explained as 
an amount necessary to bring about a settlement.60 The Court 
added that a plaintiff should not necessarily be required to 
demonstrate the weakness of the underlying patent in order to 
establish a prima facie case of antitrust unlawfulness, stating 
that “[a]n unexplained large reverse payment itself would 
normally suggest that the patentee had serious doubts about 
the patent’s survival.”61 
In rejecting the FTC’s argument that reverse payment 
settlements should be deemed “presumptively unlawful” and 
should proceed via a “quick look” approach, the Court 
explained: 
[A]bandonment of the “rule of reason” in favor of presumptive rules 
(or a “quick-look” approach) is appropriate only where “an observer 
with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude 
that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive 
effect on consumers and markets.” We do not believe that reverse 
                                                          
 56. Id. at 2231. 
 57. Id. at 2234. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. (quoting FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 US. 447, 460–61 
(1986)). 
 60. Id. at 2234–35. 
 61. Id. at 2236 (emphasis added). 
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payment settlements, in the context we here discuss, meet this 
criterion.62 
Remanding the case to the Eleventh Circuit for further 
consideration, the Court said that it would “leave to the lower 
courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason litigation.”63 
IV. WHAT DID ACTAVIS DECIDE? 
Before determining the extent to which state antitrust 
regulation of reverse payment settlements is preempted by 
federal law, one must first determine what was actually 
decided by Actavis. While there is disagreement regarding 
which side actually won the case, all agree that the decision left 
a considerable number of issues undecided. 
The Court explicitly rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s “near-
automatic antitrust immunity to reverse payment settlements” 
and the FTC’s “presumptively unlawful” approach,64 but 
provided relatively vague guidance for determining which such 
settlements violate federal antitrust laws and which do not. 
The Court said that “[a]n unexplained large reverse payment 
itself would normally suggest that the patentee has serious 
doubts about the patent’s survival,” and that the existence of 
such serious doubts “in turn, suggests that the payment’s 
objective is to maintain supracompetitive prices to be shared 
among the patentee and the challenger rather than face what 
might have been a competitive market . . . .”65 But those 
sentences raise more questions than they answer; they do not 
explain how a trial court is to determine whether the reverse 
payment is “unexplained” or “large” or when the “normal” 
inference from an “unexplained large reverse payment” might 
not be appropriate. The Court punted those issues to trial 
courts with instructions to do their best in applying a “rule of 
reason” analysis.66 Moreover, while the Court determined that 
a plaintiff challenging a reverse payment settlement can 
establish a prima facie case without establishing that the 
patent was weak and would likely have been invalidated had 
                                                          
 62. Id. at 2237 (citations omitted) (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 
U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 63. Id. at 2238. In light of its Actavis decision, the Court subsequently 
vacated and remanded the Third Circuit’s In re K-Dur decision. Upsher-Smith 
Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013). 
 64. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
 65. Id. at 2236. 
 66. Id. at 2237–38. 
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the infringement suit gone to trial,67 it did not determine 
whether trial courts may impose any limitations on defendants’ 
rights to make the opposite showing: that the patent almost 
surely would have been upheld if the infringement suit had 
gone to trial and thus that the reverse payment settlement 
could not possibly have had any anticompetitive effects. 
The Court did not even determine whether a reverse 
payment can ever be actionable when it takes the form of 
something other than cash. Use of the word “payment” at least 
suggests that the Court did not intend to address transfers of 
value other than cash, but the FTC has already rejected that 
interpretation and is attempting to use Actavis to challenge 
patent litigation settlements in which the value transferred to 
the infringing party consisted of an exclusive license to market 
a generic version of the drug during the first 180 days following 
expiration of the patent.68 Of course, as Seventh Circuit Judge 
Richard Posner has pointed out, “any settlement agreement 
can be characterized as involving ‘compensation’ to the 
defendant, who would not settle unless he had something to 
show for the settlement. If any settlement agreement is thus to 
be classified as involving a forbidden ‘reverse payment,’ we 
shall have no more patent settlements.”69 
The Actavis Court did make clear, however, that a license 
permitting an alleged infringer to bring its product to market 
prior to expiration of the patent cannot be classified as an 
unlawful reverse payment.70 Suppose that a patent is not 
scheduled to expire for another ten years and that the parties 
reach a settlement whereby the alleged infringer agrees not to 
compete for the first seven years in return for an exclusive 
license to market its product during the final three years. 
Arguably, the alleged infringer has received something of 
considerable value (a three-year exclusive license) in return for 
agreeing not to compete for seven years. The Court nonetheless 
indicated that such agreements not to compete are not 
actionable under federal antitrust law71—perhaps because the 
                                                          
 67. Id. at 2236. 
 68. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Brief as Amicus Curiae at 15–17, 
In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 3:11-cv-05479 (D.N.J. Aug. 14, 2013). 
 69. Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 
(N.D. Ill. 2003). 
 70. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
 71. Id. (stating that parties to drug patent litigation may, as in other 
industries, “settle in other ways [than making large cash reverse payments], 
for example, by allowing the generic manufacturer to enter the patentee’s 
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exclusive license increases competition and thus benefits not 
only the alleged infringer but also consumers, even though the 
agreement not to compete arguably harms consumers. 
Moreover, the Court’s repeated use of the word “balance” 
and the phrase “accommodate patent and antitrust policies”72 
made clear that any “rule of reason” analysis undertaken by a 
district court must seek to balance the competing interests of 
federal antitrust law (to promote competition) and the federal 
patent law (to provide monopoly profits to the developers of 
new and useful products and thereby encourage development of 
more such products in the future). 
Those holdings suggest some limits on the extent to which 
states should be permitted to impose antitrust liability on 
companies that enter into reverse payment drug patent 
settlements. In particular, any state-law liability is preempted 
to the extent that it would upset the balance between federal 
antitrust law and patent law established by Actavis because 
such liability would “stand[ ] as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”73 
V. ACTAVIS’S PREEMPTIVE EFFECT 
Application of state antitrust law to reverse payment 
settlements is not merely a hypothetical possibility. There are a 
fair number of pending lawsuits that challenge reverse 
payment settlements on state-law grounds. The California 
Supreme Court has agreed to review one such suit.74 In seeking 
affirmance of the appeals court’s dismissal of the suit, the 
                                                          
market prior to the patent’s expiration, without the patentee paying the 
challenger to stay out prior to that point”). 
 72. See, e.g., id. at 2231, 2233. 
 73. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 74. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012). The California 
Supreme Court held the case in abeyance while the U.S. Supreme Court was 
considering Actavis. It is reviewing a California Court of Appeals decision that 
invoked the “scope of the patent” test to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims that a 
reverse payment settlement violated state antitrust law. In re Cipro Cases I & 
II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), rev. granted, 269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 
2012). The reverse payment settlement being challenged in In re Cipro Cases I 
and II was the subject of an unsuccessful challenge in the Second Circuit 
under federal antitrust law. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 
604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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defendants argue inter alia that the suit is preempted by 
federal law.75 
As noted above, there is precedent for a finding that state 
antitrust law is preempted to the extent that it conflicts with 
the policy underlying a federal statute.76 Moreover, in the 
context of patent law, federal courts have not hesitated to 
preempt state laws that the courts deem to stand as an 
obstacle to accomplishing Congress’s objectives (i.e., 
encouraging efforts to develop new and useful products).77 To 
the extent that any portions of Actavis’s holding can be deemed 
to reflect the Court’s perception of Congress’s new-product-
development objectives, a state law is preempted if it is 
inconsistent with that holding and seeks to impose a greater 
degree of antitrust liability on the parties to a reverse payment 
settlement. 
Actavis’s treatment of settlements involving a compromise 
entry date appears to meet that description. Actavis held that 
federal antitrust liability could not arise from a settlement in 
which the generic manufacturer agrees not compete for a 
number of years and in return is rewarded with an exclusive 
license to market its product several years in advance of the 
patent’s expiration date.78 Accordingly, states are not permitted 
to impose antitrust liability under similar circumstances 
because doing so would upset the balance that, according to 
Actavis, Congress sought to achieve between antitrust and 
patent law. 
Other issues left open by Actavis are likely to be answered 
in the years ahead. For example, the Supreme Court did not 
specify whether noncash benefits received by a generic 
manufacturer in connection with a patent settlement can ever 
serve as the basis for federal antitrust liability. If the Supreme 
Court eventually answers that question by stating: “No, federal 
                                                          
 75. See, e.g., Answer Brief of Respondent Bayer Corp. at 41–47, In re 
Cipro Cases I & II, No. S198616 (Cal. May 30, 2012), 2012 WL 2379475. 
 76. See, e.g., Local 24 of Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 
(1959); supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text. 
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 78. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013); see supra notes 71–
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antitrust law will not examine settlement benefits other than 
cash that flow to the infringing party,” then it is likely that 
state antitrust law would be required to conform to that rule. 
The potential grounds for such a ruling (a desire both to 
promote settlement of patent disputes and to uphold reliance 
interests in existing patents) are based largely on values 
embedded in federal patent law. 
There is little reason to believe, however, that the Court 
would prevent application of state antitrust law to patent 
settlement agreements where state law is fully consistent with 
federal antitrust law. Even in areas subject to extensive federal 
regulation, the Supreme Court has upheld the authority of 
states to engage in parallel regulation that is not inconsistent 
with the federal regulation.79 Unless the Court were to 
determine, as in Connell,80 that states could not be trusted to 
properly accommodate the objectives of the federal statute at 
issue (here, federal patent law), there is no reason to conclude 
that Congress would not have wanted states to be permitted to 
police the same sorts of anticompetitive conduct that is policed 
by federal antitrust law. Moreover, states are likely free to 
impose greater penalties on the proscribed conduct than is 
available under federal law. As the Court explained in 
California v. ARC America Corp., state antitrust law is not 
required to adhere to the same set of sanctions imposed by 
federal antitrust law.81 
It seems reasonably clear, however, that Actavis prohibits 
states from adopting the procedural devices rejected by the 
U.S. Supreme Court—either a per se condemnation of reverse 
payment settlements or a presumption of illegality 
accompanied by “quick look” review. The Supreme Court 
rejected those approaches because it determined that in many 
cases there might well be pro-competitive economic 
justifications for reverse payment settlements and that 
presuming their illegality could result in the suppression of 
economically useful conduct.82 State antitrust laws that 
adopted the FTC’s proposed presumption of illegality would be 
subject to similar criticism, and thus would likely be impliedly 
                                                          
 79. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008) 
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 80. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
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preempted as inconsistent with the careful balance between 
antitrust and patent law established by Actavis. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Actavis left so many questions unanswered 
regarding the application of federal antitrust law to patent 
settlement agreements, the extent to which federal law 
preempts the application of state antitrust law to such 
agreements remains similarly unsettled. One can be reasonably 
confident that if private plaintiffs become dissatisfied with the 
results of pending litigation under federal antitrust law, they 
will turn with increasing frequency to state antitrust law as an 
alternative remedy. Even if state law ends up doing no more 
than “parallel” federal antitrust law, defendants are likely to 
incur substantial litigation costs fending off such state claims 
in the years to come. 
